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Informed Consent: Disclosure of the 
Presentence Investigation Report Before a 
Guilty Plea 
GEORGE D. BELL* 
The Constitution bestows upon all accused persons the 
right to a trial by jury, the right to confront accusers, the 
right to remain silent, and the right to be presumed inno-
cent. The law requires waiver of these rights to be done 
voluntarily, with the fullest possible knowledge of material 
consequences. Punishment is possibly the most material 
consequence of a guilty plea, yet criminal defendants who 
pleaded guilty are forced to relinquish their rights before 
punishment is determined. Our jurisprudence of due pro-
cess prohibits this kind of practice, but it is routine in Fed-
eral court. For a guilty plea to comport with Constitutional 
principles, before relinquishing his rights, the accused must 
know what kind of information the sentencing court will 
consider when determining his punishment. 
   
 
 *  J.D. Candidate 2021, University of Miami School of Law; B.A. 2015, 
Trinity College (Hartford, CT). Thanks are due principally to Professor Ricardo 
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the memory of my uncle James Bell.   
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INTRODUCTION 
But I have always been taught that the federal 
courts, sitting in criminal matters, are a kind of 
sanctuary in the jungle. 
—Edward Bennett Williams1 
 
Imagine you are in the market for a new car, but dealerships 
will only reveal a car’s sticker price after you buy it. Your research 
opportunities are very limited, and you have no recourse following 
the transaction. In such a scheme, the buyer is profoundly disad-
vantaged and almost guaranteed to overpay. Yet criminal defend-
ants face this arrangement every day in federal court. 
A criminal defendant enters a plea of guilty to charges against 
him. His punishment is determined by the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, a numerical grid where a certain “score” is equivalent 
to a period of months in prison.2 An officer from the probation de-
partment, a branch of the judiciary, is tasked with calculating the 
guidelines score.3 The calculations are enumerated in a document 
 
 1 MICHAEL TIGAR, PERSUASION: THE LITIGATOR’S ART 9 (1999) (emphasis 
added). 
 2 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 5, pt. A sentencing tbl. (U.S. 
SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
 3 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)–(d)(1). 
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called the Pre-Sentence Report (the “PSR”).4 Written in secret, the 
PSR’s guidelines score forms the basis for a court’s sentence.5 The 
report calculates “the defendant’s history and characteristics,”6 
applicable enhancements under the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines,7 and an entire host of other information.8 When the probation 
officer suggests a more severe punishment, the sentencing court 
almost always adopts the recommendations.9 At that point, the cen-
tral rationale of taking a plea deal, to avoid harsher punishment, 
becomes pointless. 
Beyond general principles of fairness, the Constitution com-
mands that a defendant be able to see the PSR before he decides to 
waive his rights.10 A guilty plea must be made knowingly and in-
telligently.11 A plea made without knowledge of the court-
calculated guidelines score in the PSR is unknowing and therefore 
violates the accused’s due process rights. As part of making an 
intelligent guilty plea with full knowledge of the consequences, a 
defendant should be allowed to see his own sticker price before 
doing so. Part I describes the original conception of the probation 
department report, how it changed under the federal sentencing 
guidelines regime, and the current procedural rights of offenders 
seeking to challenge its contents. Part II explores how the due pro-
cess rights of the accused who enters a guilty plea have evolved, 
both before and after the Sentencing Reform Act. Finally, Part III 
concludes with a discussion of how the offender’s due process 
rights are violated by suppression of the PSR and addresses coun-
terarguments. 
 
 4 Id. 
 5 See id.; FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e)(1). 
 6 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(A). 
 7 See id.; FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(1); U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 
2, introductory cmt. (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
 8 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(G). 
 9 See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 146 F.3d 219, 221 (4th Cir. 1998); 
United States v. Woods, 907 F.2d 1540, 1542 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 10 See infra Part II.A. 
 11 See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); FED. R. CRIM. P. 
11(b)(2). 
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I.  THE PSR: NOT WHAT IT USED TO BE 
A. The PSR Was Invented for Rehabilitative Purposes 
There was a time, before the era of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines,12 when rehabilitation was an indispensable penological 
goal of the American criminal justice system.13 A “punishment was 
intended to fit the offender and not merely the crime.”14 The pre-
vailing belief was that no two crimes were the same.15 Although 
two criminal acts may have fallen into identical legal categories, 
they were committed by different people with separate life histo-
ries and characteristics.16 The justified presumption was that “by 
careful study of the lives and personalities of convicted offenders 
[they] could be less severely punished and restored sooner to com-
plete freedom and useful citizenship.”17 It was therefore critical for 
the sentencing judge, when selecting an appropriate punishment, to 
possess “the fullest information possible concerning the defend-
ant’s life and characteristics.”18 
To make certain that judges intelligently exercised their broad 
discretion in the individualized sentencing regime, legislatures be-
gan encouraging specific investigative techniques.19 The federal 
“manifestation” was Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure.20 The rule provided “for consideration by federal judges of 
reports made by probation officers containing information about 
the convicted defendant, including such information ‘as may be 
 
 12 The U.S. Sentencing Commission was established in 1984. About the 
Commission, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, https://www.ussc.gov/ (last visited May 15, 
2021). 
 13 See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (“Retribution is no 
longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilita-
tion have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence.”). 
 14 Id. at 247. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 249. 
 18 Id. at 247. 
 19 See id. at 245 (“To aid a judge in exercising [broad] discretion . . . proce-
dural policy encourages him to consider information about the convicted per-
son’s past life, health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities.”). 
 20 Id. at 246. 
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helpful in imposing a sentence or in granting probation . . . .’”21 
Congress also enacted a law that gave sentencing judges power to 
receive unlimited information “concerning the background, charac-
ter, and conduct” of a convicted offender.22 
The PSR’s function contemplated during the individualized 
sentencing era was to gather extensive biographical information to 
evaluate a person’s likelihood of rehabilitation.23 Probation offic-
ers, in making their reports, sought to aid offenders rather than in-
crease punishments.24 Indeed, a rehabilitation theory of criminal 
justice was the genesis of the United States Probation Department 
itself.25 With the advent of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
however, criminal law returned to the “old rigidly fixed punish-
ments”26 where rehabilitation played a minimal role. The PSR’s 
complexion radically changed to the detriment of offenders it was 
originally intended to help. 
B. The PSR Was Weaponized by a “Real Conduct” Sentencing 
Philosophy 
The idea that two offenders who committed the same crime 
could receive different sentences began to frustrate lawmakers and 
proponents of uniformity, who saw the disparities as unfair.27 
There was also disenchantment with the idea that rehabilitation 
 
 21 Id. (citing Stephan v. United States, 133 F.2d 87, 100 (6th Cir. 1943) 
(quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2) (1946)). 
 22 See 18 U.S.C. § 3661. 
 23 Ricardo J. Bascuas, The American Inquisition: Sentencing After the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 57 (2010). 
 24 Williams, 337 U.S. at 249 (“Probation workers making reports of their 
investigations have not been trained to prosecute but to aid offenders.”). 
 25 See JOHN AUGUSTUS, A REPORT OF THE LABORS OF JOHN AUGUSTUS, FOR 
THE LAST TEN YEARS, IN AID OF THE UNFORTUNATE 23 (Boston, Wright & Has-
ty 1852) (“The object of the law is to reform criminals, and to prevent crime and 
not to punish maliciously, or from a spirit of revenge.”). 
 26 See Williams, 337 U.S. at 248. 
 27 See Kenneth R. Feinberg, Federal Criminal Sentencing Reform: Con-
gress and the United States Sentencing Commission, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
291, 295–96 (1993) (“Evidence that similar offenders convicted of similar of-
fenses received, at times, grossly disproportionate punishments struck a critical 
nerve among key legislators . . . .”). 
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was a legitimate penological aim.28 Marvin Frankel, former Dis-
trict Judge for the Southern District of New York, and an early 
proponent of sentencing reform, asserted that: 
The [rehabilitative] theory is flawed in the vague-
ness and overbreadth of its premise, the idea of 
‘sickness’ calling for medical or quasimedical 
‘treatment.’ . . . We sentence large numbers of peo-
ple . . . who have coldly and deliberately appraised 
the risks and rewards, taken their stand against re-
ceived morality, but then had the misfortune to be 
caught. Whatever else such defendants may need or 
otherwise deserve, they are not promising candi-
dates for any sort of useful ‘treatment’ available in 
either our prisons or our hospitals.29 
The frustration boiled over into the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984,30 which created the United States Sentencing Commission 
tasked with drafting a set of Federal Sentencing Guidelines.31 
Made official in 1987, the Guidelines shunned rehabilitation as an 
appropriate penological goal, choosing instead to emphasize retri-
bution and deterrence.32 
Originally conceived as a rehabilitative instrument, the PSR 
was weaponized to satisfy “real conduct” sentencing, a vital com-
 
 28 See Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 
31 (1972). 
 29 Id. (footnote omitted). 
 30 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 
(1984). 
 31 Id. § 991 98 Stat. 1987, 2017 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 991); 
id. § 994 Stat. 1987, 2019 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 994). 
 32 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)(2)(A)–(D) (2018); United States v. Wise, 976 
F.2d 393, 399 (8th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he Sentencing Reform Act places rehabilita-
tion of the defendant as the last of four goals to be accomplished through a sen-
tence, the first three of which are punishment, deterrence, and incapacitation.”); 
Sharon M. Bunzel, The Probation Officer and the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines: Strange Philosophical Bedfellows, 104 YALE L.J. 933, 950–51 (1995); 
United States Sentencing Commission Supplementary Report on the Initial Sen-
tencing Guidelines and Policy Statements, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 
https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/guidelines-archive/1987-supplementary-report-
initial-sentencing-guidelines-and-policy-statements (last visited May 15, 2021). 
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ponent of the Guidelines.33 In a real conduct scheme, sentencing 
judges must consider “[c]onduct that is not formally charged or is 
not an element of the offense”34 when determining an offender’s 
punishment.35 Congress ensured that, under the new regime, a PSR 
would continue to be generated for every convicted offender36 
even though most of the background information collected for re-
habilitative purposes was irrelevant.37 Instead, the PSR now served 
as an “authoritative recounting of the conduct underlying [crimi-
nal] charges of conviction, of any other charged or uncharged 
criminal conduct, and of the presumptive Guidelines calcula-
tion.”38 
Since relevant conduct only required establishment by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence,39 information from the PSR was (and 
continues to be) routinely used to jack up an offender’s sentence.40 
 
 33 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A, subpart 1.4(a) (U.S. 
SENT’G COMM’N 2018) (explaining that initially, the Commission intended to 
create a “pure real offense system” that punished defendants for both charged 
and uncharged conduct); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 250–51 (2005) 
(“Congress’ basic statutory goal—a system that diminishes sentencing dispari-
ty—depends for its success upon judicial efforts to determine, and to base pun-
ishment upon, the real conduct that underlies the crime of the conviction.”). 
 34 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 1B1.3 cmt. background (U.S. 
SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
 35 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 250–52. 
 36 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1)(A). 
 37 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.2 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 
2018) (“education and vocational skills are not ordinarily relevant”); id. § 5H1.4 
(“drug or alcohol dependence, abuse, or addiction to gambling is not a reason 
for a downward departure”); id. § 5H1.5 (“employment record is not ordinarily 
relevant”); id. § 5H1.6 (“family ties and responsibilities are not ordinarily rele-
vant”); id. § 5H1.10 (“race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and socio-
economic status . . . are not relevant”); id. § 5H1.11 (civic work, charity work, 
other good deeds not ordinarily relevant); id. § 5H1.12 (“disadvantaged upbring-
ing” and “lack of guidance” are not ordinarily relevant). 
 38 Bascuas, supra note 23, at 57. 
 39 United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 441 (1989). 
 40 See, e.g., Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 393–94 (1995) (sentenc-
ing court increased defendant’s base offense level where PSI suggested that, in 
addition to attempted marijuana distribution outlined in indictment, defendant 
planned to import cocaine as part of same conspiracy); United States v. Cole, 
569 F.3d 774, 775 (2009) (“The district court accepted the plea agreement but 
found that, based on information in the presentence report, that Cole should be 
held responsible for a greater quantity of drugs than the amount he had admitted 
1286 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:1279 
 
Courts were largely comfortable with the PSR’s new function, 
clinging to the fantasy that probation officers were neutral judicial 
employees indifferent to the defendant’s culpability.41 The idea 
that the PSR was incorporated as part of a rehabilitative model was 
all but abandoned.42 
Propagandists maintain that, because judges need all the infor-
mation they can get when sentencing an offender, the PSR remains 
critical in a uniform sentencing scheme.43 In fact, the Supreme 
Court contemplates the PSR (and its Guideline calculations) as the 
starting point of sentencing decisions.44 Judges then must consider 
the nature of the offense, characteristics of the defendant (many of 
 
to in the agreement.”); United States v. Osborne, 931 F.2d 1139, 1154–56, 1159 
(7th Cir. 1991) (sentencing court denied acceptance of responsibility adjustment 
for both co-defendants based on PSI’s recommendation and increasing a co-
defendant’s criminal history category where PSI asserted a prior conviction was 
pursuant to a state misdemeanor rather than a local ordinance violation); United 
States v. Woods, 907 F.2d 1540, 1542 (5th Cir. 1990) (district court, at sugges-
tion of probation officer, disregarded plea agreement’s stipulation in favor a 
much higher quantity of drugs); United States v. Larkin, 629 F.3d 177, 180–81 
(3rd. Cir. 2010) (sentencing court used suggestions in the PSI to justify an up-
ward departure and final sentence of 361 months where plea agreement contem-
plated a maximum of 151 months); United States v. Washington, 146 F.3d 219, 
221 (4th Cir.1998) (district court relied on PSI’s assertion that 20.3 grams of 
cocaine base were seized from defendant despite plea agreement stipulating that 
total relevant conduct would be limited to cocaine). 
 41 See United States v. Johnson, 935 F.2d 47, 49–50 (4th Cir. 1991) (“[A] 
probation officer continues a neutral, information-gathering agent of the court, 
not an agent of the prosecution.”); United States v. Belgard, 894 F.2d 1092, 
1097 (9th Cir. 1990) (“While the details of the duties and role of a probation 
officer have changed under the Guidelines, the probation officer’s essential 
function remains the same today as it was before November 1, 1987. The proba-
tion officer’s duty is to compile information which then takes the form of a neu-
tral written recommendation to the judge.” (emphasis added)). 
 42 Belgard, 894 F.2d at 1097 (“[T]he presentence report is not tied to the 
rehabilitative model . . . .”); see also id. at 1097 n.4 (“[D]iscipline (or punish-
ment) can perform a character-changing rehabilitative function.”). 
 43 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 1B1.4 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 
2018); 18 U.S.C. § 3661. 
 44 E.g., Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007) (“The sentencing 
judge, as a matter of process, will normally begin by considering the presentence 
report and its interpretation of the Guidelines.”); see also Gall v. United States, 
552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (“As a matter of administration and to secure nationwide 
consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial bench-
mark.”). 
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which are declared irrelevant by the Guidelines anyway),45 the 
kinds of sentences available, and the need to avoid unwanted sen-
tencing disparities.46 Once a sentence is calculated, it is presumed 
reasonable if within the applicable guidelines range and will rarely 
be disturbed on appeal.47 
The argument that the PSR serves a vital function in the Guide-
lines era is disingenuous. It is true that judges do need all the in-
formation they can get about an accused at sentencing, but not for 
“careful study of the lives and personalities of offenders” so they 
can be “restored sooner to complete freedom and useful citizen-
ship.”48 If uniformity is the goal, then individualized information is 
superfluous.49 There is another, more nefarious purpose of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines—where possible, impose the harsh-
est and most punitive sentence the law will allow. It is to satisfy 
this goal that judges continue to “require” as much information as 
possible about the accused prior to sentencing.50 
The PSR’s contents make it an effective weapon for real con-
duct sentencing. A presentence investigation is conducted in every 
criminal case, and each investigation is codified into a report.51 
 
 45 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.2 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 
2018) (“education and vocational skills are not ordinarily relevant”); id. § 5H1.4 
(“drug or alcohol dependence, abuse, or addiction to gambling is not a reason 
for a downward departure”); id. § 5H1.5 (“employment record is not ordinarily 
relevant”); id. § 5H1.6 (“family ties and responsibilities are not ordinarily rele-
vant”); id. § 5H1.10 (“race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and socio-
economic status . . . are not relevant”); id. § 5H1.11 (civic work, charity work, 
other good deeds not ordinarily relevant); id. § 5H1.12 (“disadvantaged upbring-
ing” and “lack of guidance” are not ordinarily relevant); What Are Sentencing 
Guidelines?, UNIV. MINN. (Mar. 21, 2018), https://sentencing.umn.edu/
content/what-are-sentencing-guidelines. 
 46 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
 47 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005) (interpreting 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) to imply an appellate review standard of reasonableness); see 
also Rita, 551 U.S. at 341 (“Several circuits have held . . . they will presume that 
a sentence imposed within a properly calculated United States Sentencing 
Guideline range is a reasonable sentence . . . . The most important question be-
fore us is whether the law permits [them] to use this presumption. We hold that 
it does.”). 
 48 See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 249 (1949). 
 49 See Bascuas, supra note 23, at 6–7. 
 50 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 51 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1). 
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The report must include a criminal history, the defendant’s finan-
cial condition, any victim impact, any information relevant to the 
§ 3553(a) factors, and statements of forfeiture or restitution.52 It 
also includes a thorough description of all relevant conduct that 
determines the defendant’s “offense level” under the guidelines.53 
Very often, probation officers simply rely on government allega-
tions when setting out the offender’s relevant conduct.54 
Another aspect of the PSR useful to real conduct sentencing is 
an interview with the defendant. Although not required, probation 
officers usually interview the defendant as part of their presentence 
investigation.55 The defendant is essentially mandated to furnish 
information for the probation officer and must submit to the inter-
view.56 If a defendant fails to furnish requested information, it can 
be held against them in the final report.57 If the defendant furnishes 
incomplete or inaccurate information, they can receive a two-level 
enhancement to their eventual Guidelines sentence for obstructing 
justice.58 Even if probation already has the information they seek, a 
 
 52 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2); 18 U.S.C. 3883(a). 
 53 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(1)(B); see Gary M. Maveal, Federal Presentence 
Reports: Multi-Tasking at Sentencing, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 544, 563 (1996) 
(“In particular, the [probation] officer must describe the ‘relevant conduct,’ 
which determines the base offense level and specific offense characteristics 
under the Guidelines.”). 
 54 See United States v. Cuellar-Flores, 891 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir. 1989) (find-
ing that a probation officer’s testimony was reliable because he obtained the 
information from a law enforcement officer and had no reason to “misrepresent 
the facts”); U.S. PROB. OFF. FOR THE W. DIST. OF N.C., THE PRESENTENCE 
INVESTIGATION REPORT: A GUIDE TO THE PRESENTENCE PROCESS 23 (2009) 
[hereinafter PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT] (“[Defense counsel] 
is . . . encouraged to present his or her perspective on the offense conduct . . . . 
In most cases, failing to do so leaves the probation officer with little option but 
to present the case as presented by the government.”). 
 55 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2). 
 56 See, e.g., PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 54, at 5–6, 
23; Bascuas, supra note 23, at 60 (“Courts require the interview even though no 
statute does . . . .”). 
 57 See PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 54, at 23. 
 58 See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 68 F.3d 1050, 1055–56 (8th Cir. 
1995) (holding that a “two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice” was 
warranted where defendant failed to provide complete financial records request-
ed by the probation officer during presentence investigation); United States v. 
Ramunno, 133 F.3d 476, 481–82 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding two-level enhance-
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defendant can still be penalized for not providing it.59 If the de-
fendant does not outright mislead or lie to the probation depart-
ment, the “totality of their conduct” can still be used to justify the 
enhancement.60 The interview can also be used as a basis for deny-
ing an acceptance of responsibility reduction, even though the de-
fendant has already done so by submitting a guilty plea.61 
 
ment for obstruction of justice where defendant attempted to conceal assets con-
nected to uncharged conduct); United States v. Christman, 894 F.2d 339, 342 
(9th Cir. 1990) (affirming a ruling where defendant received a two-level en-
hancement for obstruction of justice for mischaracterizing his criminal record to 
a probation officer); see also U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 cmt. 
n.4(H) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) (listing failure to provide information re-
quested by a probation officer as an example of obstructing or impeding justice). 
 59 See United States v. Baker, 894 F.2d 1083, 1083–84 (9th Cir. 1990) (de-
fendant received a two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice for misrep-
resenting his record notwithstanding the fact that probation had access to the 
defendant’s FBI rap sheet while the defendant did not). 
 60 See United States v. Gabel, 85 F.3d 1217, 1222 (7th Cir. 1996) (uphold-
ing the district court’s conclusion that the “totality of Gabel’s behavior” sup-
ported the conclusion that he willfully misstated information to Probation during 
preparation of the PSR); United States v. Thomas, 11 F.3d 1392, 1400 (7th Cir. 
1993) (affirming an obstruction of justice enhancement where the record sup-
ported the district court’s determination that the defendant had “provided false 
information to [a] probation officer” during the presence investigation); see also 
Ramunno, 133 F.3d at 482 (“[T]he district court’s credibility determination finds 
support in the totality of Ramunno’s conduct in this investigation . . . .”). But see 
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL §3C1.1 cmt. n.5(C) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 
2018) (declaring that “providing incomplete or misleading information, not 
amounting to a materials falsehood, in respect to a presentence report” does not 
typically warrant an upward adjustment). 
 61 See United States v. Osborne, 931 F.2d 1139, 1155 (7th Cir. 1991) (deny-
ing a co-defendant’s acceptance of responsibility reduction because, according 
to the PSR, despite the defendant pleading guilty, “he ha[d] not admitted in-
volvement in cocaine trafficking.”); id. at 1156 (denying a co-defendant’s ac-
ceptance of responsibility reduction where, although he continued to cooperate 
with government investigators, he continued to “deny his knowing involvement 
in the cocaine conspiracy throughout the period of his interviews with the proba-
tion officer”); United States v. Thompson, 876 F.2d 1381, 1384–85 (8th Cir. 
1989) (upholding a denial of a two point reduction for acceptance of responsibil-
ity because “when [the defendant] was questioned by the probation officer, he 
simply answered ‘it’s a long story, I don’t want to talk about it.’”). But see 
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (“Central to the plea and the 
foundation for entering judgement against the defendant is the defendant’s ad-
mission in open court that he committed the acts charged in the indictment.”). 
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The parameters of the PSR make it well suited to its new role 
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Far from its originally 
rehabilitative function, the PSR now amounts to a charging docu-
ment seeking to enhance sentences wherever conceivably possi-
ble.62 Probation officers “officiously investigate and tabulate each 
defendant’s transgressions so that he can more efficiently be made 
to pay for them.”63 Rather than gauging a defendant’s prospects for 
rehabilitation, the PSR’s new function under the Guidelines is to 
gauge an offender’s prospects for punishment.64 
C.  Current Rights of the Defendant 
At a time where “rehabilitative efforts and individualized jus-
tice are shunned[,] . . . [t]oday’s probation officer has been forced 
to don new robes” by becoming an advocate for increasing pun-
ishment.65 Yet the PSR is still regarded by courts as the same cru-
cial, presumptively reliable document requiring no application of 
the usual procedural safeguards accorded to the accused.66 It is not, 
nor has it ever been, subject to the “crucible of cross examina-
tion.”67 It is not limited by the rule against hearsay or the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.68 Rule 32 was amended in conjunction with the 
 
 62 See Maveal, supra note 53, at 562–63. 
 63 Bascuas, supra note 23, at 7. 
 64 See Maveal, supra note 53, at 569 (“[T]he PSR routinely reads as if writ-
ten by the defendant’s adversary in ascribing criminal conduct to him.”); 
Bunzel, supra note 32, at 959–60 (1995) (observing that, after the Sentencing 
Reform Act, PSR’s devote far more space to guidelines calculations than per-
sonal characteristics of the offender). 
 65 Bunzel, supra note 32, at 966. 
 66 United States v. Espalin, 350 F.3d 488, 496 (6th Cir. 2003) (Lawson, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he recommendations that are most useful to the district 
judge . . . are tied to the facts of the case as set forth in the body of the PSR.”); 
United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401, 436 (6th Cir. 2000) (“The district court 
must ordinarily rely in considerable measure upon the presentence report . . . .”); 
see United States v. Belgard, 894 F.2d 1092, 1096–98 (9th Cir. 1990); Williams 
v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949); Stephen A. Fennell & William L. Hall, 
Due Process at Sentencing: An Empirical and Legal Analysis of the Disclosure 
of Presentence Reports in Federal Courts, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1627–29, 
1631 (1980). 
 67 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004); see FED. R. CRIM. P. 
32(c)(3)(A) advisory committee’s notes to 1974 amendment. 
 68 See, e.g., United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 404 (8th Cir. 1992) (hold-
ing that a probation officer’s hearsay testimony was still sufficiently reliable to 
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Guidelines so that defendants could not waive preparation of the 
report—an obvious change to maximize its effectiveness as a 
weapon of real conduct.69 These protections are blind to the fact 
that a probation officer’s role has been transformed from a neutral 
judicial employee into a “third adversary.”70 Courts have scrupu-
lously followed the legislative command that “no limitation shall 
be placed”71 on evidence received by a sentencing court when it 
comes to the PSR.72 
Rule 32 does provide some limited procedural safeguards.73 
When a defendant is seeking to challenge the contents and factual 
determinations in the PSI, however, these safeguards are usually of 
little or no help.74 The probation department is not obligated to 
further investigate, or revise the presentence report, or meet with 
the parties based on their objections.75 A judge can even order pro-
bation to withhold the recommended guidelines sentence from the 
defendant’s copy.76 The burden is heavy when confronting a doc-
ument that courts consider fundamentally reliable. Though it is 
within the discretion of the sentencing court to hold an evidentiary 
hearing on unresolved objections, they are not required.77 In fact, 
the Guidelines contemplate that lengthy sentencing hearings will 
rarely occur.78 The Guidelines do provide that “when a dispute 
 
support district court’s sentencing conclusion because nothing in record indicat-
ed he had a reason to lie or distort facts); FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3) (stating that 
Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply at sentencing). 
 69 See Bunzel, supra note 32, at 960. 
 70 Id. at 962. 
 71 18 U.S.C. § 3661. 
 72 See, e.g., Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 488–89 (2011). 
 73 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e)(1), (f)(1), (g). 
 74 See United States v. Deninno, 29 F.3d 572, 580 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding 
that defendant bears burden of “alleging factual inaccuracies of the presentence 
report”). 
 75 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(f)(3) (“After receiving objections, the probation of-
ficer may meet with the parties to discuss the objections. The probation officer 
may then further investigate and revise the presentence report as appropriate.” 
(emphases added)). 
 76 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e)(3) (“By local order . . . the court may direct the 
probation office not to disclose to anyone other than the court the officer’s rec-
ommendation on the sentence.”). 
 77 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(2); Maveal, supra note 53, at 571–2. 
 78 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 cmt. (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 
2018) (“[L]engthy sentencing hearings seldom should be necessary . . . .”). 
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exists about any factor important to the sentencing determination, 
the court must ensure that the parties have an adequate opportunity 
to present relevant information.”79 This, however, is hardly useful 
in a proceeding that contains none of the usual protections afforded 
to the accused. “Written statements of counsel or affidavits of wit-
nesses,” the preferred method for solving factual disputes, may 
contain outright fallacies with multiple layers of hearsay.80 If there 
is an evidentiary hearing, witnesses are not required to be sworn 
(and can testify to anything they fancy) because the Federal Rules 
of Evidence do not apply.81 
Beyond the high legal bar, objecting to the PSR’s contents is 
also logistically challenging. Following the Rule 32 calendar, a 
defense attorney has just fourteen days to “articulate challenges to 
each and every factual and legal error in the PSR” before their ob-
jections must be submitted.82 Furthermore, even if the PSR is time-
ly disclosed, there remains the troubling practice of ex-parte com-
munications between the judge and the probation officer ahead of 
sentencing that may further disadvantage the defendant.83 Defense 
counsel is permitted to attend the presentence interview upon re-
quest but is entitled only to “notice and a reasonable opportunity to 
attend.”84 This, of course, means that interviews will still regularly 
be conducted without the presence of counsel, which is gravely 
concerning in a world where “a single finding by the probation 
officer [during the presentence interview] can significantly affect 
the ultimate sentencing range.”85 
The purpose of the presentence investigation is to uncover as 
much incriminating information about the defendant as possible—
”something neutral courts, by definition, do not do.”86 Yet none of 
 
 79 Id. 
 80 See id. 
 81 See FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3). 
 82 Maveal, supra note 53, at 571; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(f). 
 83 See United States v. Johnson, 935 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding 
that a defendant has no right to counsel during an ex parte presentence confer-
ence between a judge and the probation officer because it is “not a critical stage 
of the sentencing proceedings”). 
 84 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2); see United States v. Herrera-Figueroa, 918 
F.2d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 85 Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d at 1434. 
 86 See Bascuas, supra note 23, at 66–67. 
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the protections normally available in an adversarial proceeding are 
afforded to the defendant when it comes to the PSR.87 Rule 32 did 
not even require disclosure of the report until 1994.88 Even though 
it can have devastating consequences for a defendant’s sentence, 
but the PSR is given the same cavalier procedural treatment as is-
suing a search warrant or a grand jury proceeding.89 The safe-
guards as they currently stand are plainly insufficient to protect the 
accused. 
II.  THE RIGHT VIOLATED: A KNOWING, INTELLIGENT PLEA 
A.  Constitutional Requirements of a Guilty Plea 
The Constitution commands that for a plea of guilty to be valid, 
it must be made intelligently, with full knowledge of the conse-
quences and free from coercion.90 Rightfully so: “[a] defendant 
who enters [a guilty] plea simultaneously waives several constitu-
tional rights, including his privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, his right to a trial by jury, and his right to confront 
his accusers.”91 A guilty plea “is more than a confession which 
admits the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; noth-
ing remains but to give judgement and determine punishment.”92 
Like any other waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, a 
guilty plea must be shown to be “an intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege” that overcomes every 
reasonable presumption against its validity.93 
Plea bargaining has been around since well before the colonies 
declared their independence.94 It was originally conceived as a 
method to combat harsh punishments in English Courts and incor-
 
 87 See id. at 72, 76. 
 88 See Maveal, supra note 53, at 564. 
 89 See FED. R. EVID. 1101(d). 
 90 See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969); Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). 
 91 McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466. 
 92 Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242. 
 93 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
 94 See Plea Bargaining—Proposed Amendments to Federal Criminal Rule 
11, 56 MINN. L. REV 718, 718 (1972). 
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porated into the American system with similar rationale.95 Consid-
ered “a necessary evil below the dignity of court,” plea bargaining 
and guilty pleas have always been given substandard treatment in 
American criminal jurisprudence.96 Federal courts did eventually 
warm to the idea.97 
Courts were slow to adopt the idea, though, that there are con-
stitutional protections afforded to the accused when making an 
official admission of guilt. Before the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure were enacted in 1946,98 guilty pleas were rarely dis-
turbed on appeal. The prevailing wisdom was that an accused did 
not even have the right to appeal the proper entry of a guilty plea.99 
Courts reasoned that, although the common law permits a defend-
ant to “withdraw his plea of guilty before a judgement,” he cannot 
contest the validity of his plea after a judgement has been ren-
dered.100 Since a plea of guilty means no trial is held, there is noth-
ing about the properly entered judgement that can be appealed.101 
Such rationale begs the question: what is the manner of proper 
entry of a judgement against an accused who pleads guilty? In 
Lowe v. State,102 the Maryland Court of Appeals reasoned that the 
word “properly” related not only to “mere form” of the entry of a 
judgement, but to the substance as well.103 For a judgement on a 
guilty plea to be properly entered: 
[T]he plea must be entirely voluntary. It must not be 
induced by fear, or by misrepresentation, persua-
 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 See Dominick R. Vetri, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prose-
cutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 870 n.21 (1964); Ander-
son v. North Carolina, 221 F. Supp. 930, 934 (W.D.N.C. 1963); Barber v. Glad-
den, 220 F. Supp. 308, 311–314 (D. Or. 1963); United States v. Cariola, 323 
F.2d 180, 182, 187 (3rd Cir. 1963). 
 98 See FED. R. CRIM. P. at VII. 
 99 See City of Edina v. Beck, 47 Mo. App. 234, 236 (1891) (“[T]he conclu-
sion follows that the appeal was properly dismissed, unless we can hold that a 
party may appeal from a judgement properly entered against him upon his plea 
of guilty, which is in effect a judgement by confession. This we cannot hold.”). 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Lowe v. State, 111 Md. 1 (1909). 
 103 Id. at 14. 
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sion, or holding out false hopes, nor made through 
ignorance or inadvertence. The Court should be sat-
isfied as to the voluntary character of the plea be-
fore giving judgement and passing sentence, and in 
some States such an investigation is required by 
Statute. In some States the statute requires the court 
to admonish the defendant as to the consequences of 
his guilty plea . . . . Before proceeding to make such 
a plea the foundation of a judgement however, the 
Court should, and frequently by statute must, see 
that it is made by a person of competent intelli-
gence, freely and voluntarily, and with a full under-
standing of its nature and effect, and of the facts on 
which it is founded.104 
Using this rationale, the court held that it was error “to receive 
the plea of guilty without being satisfied that the accused fully un-
derstood its nature and effect” and reversed.105 Several years later, 
in Nicely v. Butcher, the West Virginia Supreme Court overturned 
a petitioner’s guilty plea on identical grounds.106 Eventually, the 
idea that a court had the duty to ascertain whether a guilty plea was 
knowingly and intelligently made found its way into the federal 
domain.107 
Upon enactment of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
the proper way to enter judgement against the accused who plead 
guilty became more formalized.108 Rule 11 essentially codified 
what was already an existing practice in many courtrooms across 
the country.109 As enacted in 1946, it simply declared that “[t]he 
court . . . shall not accept a plea [of guilty] without first determin-
 
 104 Id at 14–15. (emphasis omitted) (first quoting 12 Cyc. 353; and then quot-
ing 19 Cyc. 437). 
 105 Id. at 20. 
 106 See Nicely v. Butcher, 94 S.E. 147, 148 (W. Va. 1917). 
 107 See Fogus v. United States, 34 F.2d 97, 98–99 (4th Cir. 1929) (holding 
that petitioner’s guilty pleas were valid because the record indicated they were 
received by the trial judge in compliance with the rule stated in Nicely). 
 108 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
 109 See id. at advisory committee’s note to 1944 adoption. 
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ing that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the na-
ture of the charge.”110 
Courts spent decades unpacking the requirements the new rule 
and its impact on the correct procedure of entering a judgement on 
a guilty plea against the accused.111 To comply with Rule 11, for 
example, the Sixth Circuit held that “the District Court need not 
follow any particular ritual” and that “[a] brief discussion with the 
defendant regarding the nature of the charges may normally be the 
simplest and most direct method of ascertaining the state of his 
knowledge.”112 On the other hand, the Second Circuit declared that 
“[a] mere routine inquiry—the asking of several standard ques-
tions—will not suffice to discharge the duty of the trial court. It is 
the duty of a federal judge before accepting a plea of guilty to 
thoroughly investigate the circumstances under which it is 
made.”113 The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Davis held that a 
court still must discharge the duty imposed by Rule 11, even if the 
accused “is represented by counsel of his choice.”114 
In 1966, Rule 11 was amended115 to further clarify the trial 
judge’s responsibilities when entering a judgement against a de-
fendant who submits a guilty plea.116 The new language required a 
sentencing court “to address the defendant personally in the course 
of determining that the plea is made voluntarily and with under-
standing of the nature of the charge.”117 The new rule also required 
the judge to make an independent finding that the plea had a factu-
al basis.118 Despite the amended rule, though, courts were still split 
on how strictly Rule 11 must be followed.119 Two cases announced 
 
 110 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (1946). 
 111 See infra notes 112–114. 
 112 Julian v. United States, 236 F.2d 155, 158 (6th Cir. 1956). 
 113 United States v. Lester, 247 F.2d 496, 499–500 (2nd Cir. 1957). 
 114 United States v. Davis, 212 F.2d 264, 267 (7th Cir. 1954). 
 115 Elaine Brand, Revised Federal Rule 11: Tighter Guidelines for Pleas in 
Criminal Cases, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1010, 1010, 1016 (1976). 
 116 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment. 
 117 See id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Compare Heiden v. United States, 353 F.2d 53, 55 (9th Cir. 1965) (hold-
ing that appellant’s guilty plea be set aside where the district court did not fully 
comply with Rule 11 procedures), with Kennedy v. United States, 397 F.2d 16, 
17 (6th Cir. 1968) (“Heiden has been rejected in at least three Circuits . . . . We 
are not inclined to follow it.”). 
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in the Supreme Court’s 1969 term were critical for shaping the 
rule’s clarity and protections.120 
In McCarthy v. United States,121 the court announced that a de-
fendant whose plea is accepted without strict adherence to Rule 11 
is invalid.122 The court further stated that “prejudice inheres in a 
failure to comply with Rule 11.”123 In doing so, though, the court 
did not reach any of the constitutional arguments advanced for re-
versal.124 Rather, they based the decision solely upon Rule 11’s 
construction made pursuant to their supervisory power over the 
lower federal courts.125 Though not reaching their decision on con-
stitutional grounds, the Supreme Court did note that Rule 11 “is 
designed to assist the district judge in making the constitutionally 
required determination that a defendant’s guilty plea is truly volun-
tary.”126 They remarked that, since an accused waives important 
constitutional rights when pleading guilty, those waivers must be 
“an intentional relinquishment” of those rights.127 Therefore, “if a 
defendant’s plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been 
obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void.”128 
In Boykin v. Alabama,129 the Supreme Court reached similar 
conclusions but rested their decision on constitutional grounds.130 
The court found that, based on a silent record, an effective waiver 
of the petitioner’s constitutional rights was not made, and there-
fore, his plea was obtained in violation of due process.131 The ac-
cused waives important constitutional rights when he enters a 
guilty plea.132 Determining whether those waivers were obtained in 
compliance with due process requires “the utmost solicitude of 
 
 120 See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 741–42 (1969); Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242–43 (1969). 
 121 McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 459. 
 122 Id. at 471–72. 
 123 Id. at 471. 
 124 See id. at 464. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 465. 
 127 Id. at 466 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). 
 128 Id. 
 129 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). 
 130 Id. at 243. 
 131 See id. at 243. 
 132 Id. 
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which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused 
to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes 
and of its consequence.”133 In doing so, the judge evaluating a de-
fendant’s plea “leaves a record adequate for any review that later 
may be sought.”134 The court, extending their reasoning from 
Carnley v. Cochran, held that it was constitutionally required to 
show on the record an accused who pled guilty made an effective 
waiver of their constitutional rights.135 A guilty plea that was not 
made intelligently or with knowledge of the consequences, there-
fore, violated both Rule 11 and the due process clause.136 
Mostly on the impetus of Boykin, Rule 11 was further amended 
by Congress in 1974.137 Now the trial judge was required, on the 
record, to make specific inquiries of the defendant.138 The judge 
had to apprise the defendant of the important constitutional rights 
they were relinquishing, namely: the right to a trial by jury, the 
right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, the right to 
be represented by counsel, and the right to prepare his own de-
 
 133 See id. at 243–44. 
 134 See id at 244. 
 135 See id. at 242 (“We held: ‘Presuming waiver from a silent record is im-
permissible. The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence 
which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and under-
standingly rejected the offer.’” (quoting Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 
(1962)). 
 136 See id. at 242–43, 43 n.5 (citing McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 
459, 471–72 (1969)). 
 137 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, advisory committee note to 1974 Amendment. The 
advisory committee note to the 1974 Amendment to Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11 reads as follows: 
Subdivision (c) prescribes the advice which the court must 
give to the defendant as a prerequisite to the acceptance of a 
plea of guilty. The former rule required that the court deter-
mine that the plea was made with “understanding of the nature 
of the charge and the consequences of the plea.” The amend-
ment requires more specifically what must be explained to the 
defendant and also codifies, in the rule, the requirements of 
Boykin v. Alabama, which held that a defendant must be ap-
praised of the fact that he relinquished certain constitutional 
rights before pleading guilty. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 138 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1). 
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fense.139 The judge also was now required to ensure the defendant 
understood the “mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if 
any, and the maximum penalty provided by law.”140 There was no 
requirement, though, that the defendant be informed of additional 
consequences that might flow from the guilty plea, such as that a 
jury might find him guilty of only a lesser included offense.141 
With Rule 11’s new specific requirements, the judge would have to 
“develop a more complete record to support his determination in a 
subsequent post-conviction attack.”142 
As it currently stands, Rule 11 looks much the same as it did 
after the revisions in 1974, with several minor exceptions.143 After 
the enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Congress 
amended the rule to require the judge to alert the defendant that the 
judge is required to consider applicable guidelines.144 The amend-
ment did not require the court to identify which guidelines were 
important or which grounds for departure might prove signifi-
cant.145 This, of course, was because a judicial inquisitor had yet to 
compile the information that would ultimately determine the of-
fender’s punishment.146 Even Congress recognized that “it will be 
impracticable, if not impossible, to know which guidelines will be 
relevant prior to the formulation of the presentence report . . . .”147 
After the guidelines were made “advisory” by United States v. 
Booker,148 Congress further amended Rule 11’s guidelines notice 
 
 139 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(A)–(F). 
 140 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1974 amendment; see 
id. at Rule 11(b)(1)(G)–(I). The old requirement that the judge ascertain the 
defendant understand the nature of the charge was retained. Id. at Rule 11 advi-
sory committee’s note to 1974 amendment. 
 141 Id. at Rule 11 advisory committee’s note to 1974 amendment. 
 142 Id. 
 143 See id.; FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
 144 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(M); Rule 11 advisory committee’s note to 
1989 amendment. 
 145 Id. at Rule 11 advisory committee’s note to 1989 amendment. 
 146 See id. at Rule 32(c)(1)(A) (“The probation officer must conduct a 
presentence investigation and submit a report to the court before it imposes a 
sentence . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 147 Id. at Rule 11 advisory committee’s note to 1989 amendment. 
 148 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005). 
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requirement, but with little substantive change.149 Although the 
judge could technically consider other statutory concerns, Booker 
still mandated consideration of the guideline range, and the de-
fendant would be told as much.150 
B.  Guilty Pleas in the Age of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines 
The Guidelines offer an enticing prospect for the accused. If 
they pleaded guilty, thereby obviating the need for a trial, offend-
ers will receive an across-the-board two-level reduction in their 
base offense level.151 If the offense is serious and the trial will be 
onerous (a challenge that any good prosecutor should welcome), a 
defendant can get a further one-point reduction by “timely notify-
ing authorities of his intention to plead guilty.”152 In this way, the 
Guidelines, with a “backdrop” of harsh draconian prison sentences, 
achieve their secondary goal of efficiency by making trial a costly 
endeavor for the accused.153 Worse still, whatever benefit an of-
fender contemplated in a reduction, his base offense is usually ab-
rogated by enhancements from the PSR. 
The Guidelines threaten harsher punishments for exercising 
one’s right to trial in several ways. Firstly, an offender’s base level 
exposure increases by a substantial amount if they decide not to 
plead out their case.154 For example, if an accused has a base level 
of twenty-six and a criminal history category of three, their Guide-
line range is seventy-eight to ninety-seven months in prison.155 
With a reduction under § 3E1.1,156 the base offense level drops to 
twenty-four and their Guideline range becomes sixty-three to sev-
 
 149 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 2007 amendment; 
id. at Rule 11(b)(1)(M). 
 150 See id. at Rule 11 advisory committee’s note to 1989 amendment; id. at 
Rule 11 advisory committee’s note to 2007 amendment. 
 151 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(a) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 
2018). 
 152 See id. § 3E1.1(b). 
 153 See Bascuas, supra note 23, at 42–45. 
 154 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (Sentencing Table) (U.S. 
SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
 155 Id. 
 156 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(a) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 
2018). 
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enty-eight months.157 Assuming the high end of each range, an of-
fender’s exposure is about twenty percent larger if they exercise 
their trial right.158 This means that if the offender believed that the 
government had an eighty percent chance of convicting him, he is 
better off pleading guilty.159 
This contrast is even larger at lower levels, which is completely 
antithetical to the goals of efficiency promulgated by the Guide-
lines. If a system is seeking efficiency, then the most cumbersome 
obstacles to efficiency (i.e., complicated trials of complicated cas-
es) ought to be scrapped first. The larger contrast at lower-level 
offenses, however, means that offenders whose trials would be far 
more manageable are much better off waiving their rights. If an 
offender’s base level is ten, for example, and they are in a criminal 
history category of one, their Guideline range is six to twelve 
months.160 By earning a reduction under § 3E1.1,161 their base lev-
el becomes eight, with a Guideline range of zero to six months.162 
The offender, in other words, has a fifty percent larger exposure to 
punishment if he was to exercise his trial right.163 This means that, 
if the offender believed the government had only a fifty-one per-
cent chance of finding him guilty, he would plea.164 
A second way the Guidelines punish offenders for exercising 
their trial right is by threatening a two-level obstruction of justice 
enhancement for offenders who opt to testify in their own defense, 
particularly if they contradict the government’s case.165 This means 
that our same offender, who is at a base level of twenty-six and 
criminal history category of three (seventy-eight to ninety-seven 
months), actually faces a guideline range of ninety-seven to 121 
months if convicted with an obstruction enhancement.166 This 
makes a potential guilty plea for sixty-three to seventy-eight 
 
 157 Id. 
 158 See id. 
 159 See id. 
 160 Id. 
 161 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(a) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 
2018). 
 162 Id. 
 163 See id. 
 164 See id. 
 165 See id. at § 3C1.1. 
 166 See id. § 5A (Sentencing Table). 
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months seem far more attractive than putting “the government to 
its burden of proof at trial.”167 Even simple persistence in a plea of 
not guilty can drastically increase a defendant’s exposure level.168 
Thirdly, the Guidelines incentivize witnesses to corroborate the 
government’s allegations against an accused in exchange for coop-
eration agreements reducing their own punishments.169 The gov-
ernment essentially controls the agreement and can withhold its 
benefits for any reason.170 As a result, defendants who proceed to 
trial face witnesses who must testify to the government’s satisfac-
tion in order to reap the rewards of a potential cooperation deal.171 
Since this is the only substantial way to reduce one’s sentence un-
der the Guidelines (other than pleading guilty), defendants are ea-
ger to satisfy the government’s wishes.172 This significantly in-
creases the likelihood that they will offer perjured testimony or 
whatever else the prosecutor asks for.173 There is evidence to sug-
gest this does not happen infrequently.174 
It is not surprising that such a high price for going to trial in-
duces astronomically high numbers of guilty pleas. Approximately 
three percent of federal defendants put “the government to its bur-
den” from 2012 to 2016.175 This means that ninety-seven percent 
 
 167 Id. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.2. 
 168 See, e.g., Ronn Blitzer, Lori Loughlin and Mossimo Giannuli Hit with 
Money Laundering Charge in New Indictment, L. & CRIME (Apr. 9, 2019, 2:09 
PM), https://lawandcrime.com/high-profile/lori-loughlin-and-husband-mossimo-
giannulli-hit-with-money-laundering-charge-in-new-indictment/. 
 169 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 
2018). 
 170 See id. § 5K1.1 cmt. n.3. 
 171 See id. § 5K1.1. 
 172 Federal Sentencing Reductions, BURNHAM & GOROKHOV, 
https://www.burnhamgorokhov.com/criminal-defense-resources/federal-
sentencing/federal-sentencing-reductions (last visited May 15, 2021). 
 173 See Yvette A. Beeman, Accomplice Testimony Used Under Contingent 
Plea Agreements, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 800, 800, 808–09 (1987). 
 174 See, e.g., United States v. Ochoa-Vasquez, 428 F.3d 1015, 1022–23 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (describing a DEA scheme that allowed drug kingpins to surrender to 
the United States government in exchange for phony cooperation deals); United 
States v. Manske, 186 F.3d 770, 772 (7th Cir. 1999) (reversing Manske’s con-
viction where the district court prevented him from cross-examining government 
witnesses on “past acts of witness intimidation”). 
 175 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 cmt. n.2 (U.S. SENT’G 
COMM’N 2018); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2016 SOURCEBOOOK OF FEDERAL 
2021] INFORMED CONSENT 1303 
 
of defendants waived their constitutional right to a trial by jury, to 
confront their accuser, and to cross examine witnesses.176 In 1998, 
by contrast, eighty-two percent of defendants pleaded guilty in 
federal court.177 Since 1945, the rate has been as low as seventy-
seven percent (in 1981), with a steady upward trend beginning in 
the early nineties.178 If the plea rate dropped back to what it was in 
the early 1980s, the number of federal criminal trials would drasti-
cally increase.179 The twenty-first century, so far, has been the cen-
tury of waiving your right to trial.180 
An argument might be advanced that defendants should be in-
centivized to plead guilty. Nothing is preventing them from going 
to trial, and it is their choice to surrender their rights. They are 
simply engaging in a cost-benefit analysis that comes out far more 
often against trial than for it. This rationale is exactly what the Su-
preme Court renounced in United States v. Jackson.181 Congress 
may not pursue goals (here, uniformity and efficiency in criminal 
punishment) “by means that needlessly chill the exercise of basic 
constitutional rights.”182 “The question is not whether the chilling 
effect is ‘incidental’ rather than intentional; the question is whether 
that effect is unnecessary and therefore excessive.”183 Criminal 
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penalties may not be imposed “in a manner that needlessly penal-
izes the assertion of a constitutional right.”184 It need not be an in-
herently coercive penalty—the constitutional evil lies even when 
the statute “needlessly encourages” guilty pleas.185 
III.  MAKING PRE-PLEA DISCLOSURE MANDATORY 
The full presentence investigation, and the report that summa-
rizes it, should begin as soon as the defendant is indicted. A plea 
made without knowledge of the offense level computation in the 
PSR is unknowing and therefore violates due process. A guilty 
plea is “more than an admission of past conduct; it is the defend-
ant’s consent that judgement of conviction may be entered without 
a trial.”186 A trial by jury is but one of the many constitutional 
rights one surrenders when pleading guilty.187 “Waivers of consti-
tutional rights . . . must be knowing, intelligent acts done with suf-
ficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely conse-
quences.”188 It is impossible for a defendant to know the relevant 
circumstances and likely consequences of his guilty plea without 
seeing the contents of his presentence report. In order to comply 
with the high commands of due process, a defendant must see his 
presentence report before he decides to enter a guilty plea. Once it 
is finished, the defendant should be given leave to fully review the 
PSR. At that point his plea will, at the very least, be made with full 
understanding of the potential consequences, as the Constitution 
requires.189  
It is not that the PSR is always so drastically different from 
what the defendant expects to receive, or that the judge always 
adopts what the PSR says. Both, though, happen with enough fre-
quency to merit the institutional change argued here. The concern 
is at hand every time a defendant pleads guilty in federal court, 
which happens ninety-seven percent of the time.190 It is far beyond 
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the scope of this Note to compute how often, and by how much, a 
PSR’s recommendation differs from a sentencing recommendation 
between the prosecutor and the defense. Several anecdotes are in-
structive on just how unknowing and unintelligent a guilty plea can 
be without the information from the presentence report.191 
Consider Angela Larkin, who pled guilty to one count of pro-
ducing a sexually explicit image of a minor in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 2251(a).192 Her agreement with the prosecutor contem-
plated a sentencing guideline range between 121 and 151 months, 
possibly lower pursuant to a cooperation agreement.193 This was 
based on the government’s calculation that Larkin’s “criminal his-
tory fell in Category I.”194 The PSR, on the other hand, calculated 
Larkin’s criminal history fell into category two.195 Furthermore, 
the PSR identified the fact that there was a second possible victim 
of Larkin’s crime.196 It also calculated a “possible enhancement for 
the use of a computer in the commission of the offense.”197 The 
PSR contemplated a sentencing range of 168–210 months, an in-
crease of approximately thirty-nine percent from what Larkin 
thought she was getting.198 As it turns out, Larkin was sentenced to 
360 months in prison, based largely on the PSR’s identification of 
other victims in the scheme.199 If Larkin knew that her “sticker 
price” was thirty-nine percent higher than what the prosecutor was 
offering, and that her exposure could be even larger based on new 
facts in the PSR, she may well have decided to “put the govern-
ment to its burden.”200 At the very least, it cannot be said she 
 
 191 See United States v. Larkin, 629 F.3d 177, 180–83 (3rd Cir. 2019); Unit-
ed States v. Osborne, 931 F.2d 1139, 1142, 1164–66 (7th Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Washington, 146 F.3d 219, 220–23 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 192 Larkin, 629 F.3d at 180. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. at 180 n.4. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. at 180. 
 197 Id.; see U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.1(b)(3) (U.S. SENT’G 
COMM’N 2018). 
 198 See Larkin, 629 F.3d at 180. 
 199 See id. at 181. 
 200 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 cmt. n.2 (U.S. SENT’G 
COMM’N 2018). 
1306 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:1279 
 
waived her constitutional rights with full knowledge of the conse-
quences. 
Or, consider the case of William Osborne, who pleaded guilty 
to “one count of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to dis-
tribute under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2.”201 
Osborne’s plea agreement with the government placed him in a 
criminal history category of one.202 At sentencing, however, the 
PSR calculated him at a criminal category history of three.203 The 
PSR uncovered two “operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicat-
ed” convictions not previously disclosed to the defendant.204 The 
court used the information from the PSR to sentence, even though 
the judge found there was no proof that “these matters were han-
dled under state statutes.”205 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed, holding that the original plea agreement was “based upon 
an understanding of [Osborne’s] criminal record that did not in-
clude all of his convictions.”206 Both the government and Osborne 
were operating under the assumption he had no DUIs on his rec-
ord.207 In fact, the government had Osborne’s record months be-
fore the sentencing hearing.208 If the PSR had been disclosed prior 
to Osborne’s guilty plea, then both parties would have received 
valuable information that likely would have affected their bargain. 
Osborne would undoubtedly have made a more effective waiver of 
his constitutional rights. 
Finally, consider Alex Davis.209 He pleaded guilty to one drug-
related conspiracy count in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.210 Davis’ 
agreement with the government stipulated that his total relevant 
conduct “would be at least 100 but less than 200 grams of co-
caine.”211 The PSR, on the other hand, asserted that Davis’ relevant 
conduct included 20.3 grams of cocaine base and 82.7 grams of 
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cocaine hydrochloride.212 The probation officer came to this con-
clusion when he noticed the original lab report “appeared to de-
scribe a substance that included cocaine base.”213 The probation 
officer then took it upon himself to order an amended lab report to 
attach to the PSR and argue for an increase in Davis’ sentence.214 
The judge credited the PSR’s findings and sentenced Davis to sev-
enty months.215 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, reasoning 
that “if the government’s information was inaccurate, it should 
have been corrected.”216 In other words, the government faced no 
consequences for doing a poor job investigating the case. Had Da-
vis been permitted to see his “sticker price” before making a plea 
deal, the result likely would have been quite different. 
One might argue that it is impossible to do the presentence in-
vestigation without running afoul of the defendant’s Fifth Amend-
ment rights.217 This is simply not true. The defendant has never 
been obligated to participate in the presentence investigation. Fur-
thermore, the Fifth Amendment already applies to the probation 
officer’s interview of the defendant, at least to the extent that any 
admission could be used to increase punishment.218 This is essen-
tially the only point of the presentence interview anyway, since the 
defendant has already admitted they are guilty and reductions are 
rarely, if ever, available. 
A parallel argument might be that it is far more difficult for the 
probation officer to gather relevant, reliable information before the 
defendant enters a guilty plea. This also is simply not true. The 
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litany of personal information (which depends on the cooperation 
of the defendant and his/her associates) is not “ordinarily relevant” 
to sentencing under the Guidelines.219 Therefore, it matters not 
whether the information is “reliable” since the vast majority of 
judges will not even use it at sentencing anyway. Because most of 
the facts that probation would need to find for a downward vari-
ance are not usually relevant, it follows that their investigation is 
done primarily to find reliable facts that will lead to an upward 
variance.220 It appears that, in this regard, probation is doing fine 
without the defendant’s help. Just ask Angela Larkin, William Os-
borne, and Alex Davis.221 
A resource argument also fails. Probation, the argument might 
go, cannot devote officers to every case as soon as it is indicted. 
Resources will be wasted if a presentence investigation is complet-
ed only to have the defendant exercise his trial right. This is not a 
legitimate concern. In fiscal year 2018, for example, there were 
79,704 federal defendants.222 A PSR was generated in every one of 
those cases except for the 320 that ended in an acquittal.223 Since 
resources are already being devoted to presentence investigations 
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in virtually every case, it should not matter whether the effort oc-
curs before or after a defendant’s guilty plea. The proposal in this 
Note only moves the time frame up. Furthermore, disclosure of the 
PSR pre-plea would eliminate untold hundreds, or thousands, of 
sentencing appeals, based on disappointed expectations from a 
“surprise” enhancement. 
A more fundamental argument against pre-plea disclosure is 
that the defendant already knows his relevant conduct. The defend-
ant should be the least surprised of anyone when they read the PSR 
because they knew what they did. Therefore, nothing would 
change by disclosing the PSR pre-plea since the defendant knows 
the enhancements are probably coming anyway. This ignores the 
reality that the Guidelines are extremely complicated and not easi-
ly applied to every single case.224 Some enhancement can be frus-
tratingly vague, despite the fact the Guidelines are not open to 
vagueness challenges.225 Furthermore, there may be facts underly-
ing the PSR’s calculations of certain enhancements that the de-
fendant vigorously disputes. Rather than contest those facts at a 
sentencing hearing where he has virtually no rights, he may decide 
to contest those facts at a trial. This is a judgement every accused 
person is constitutionally entitled to make. 
CONCLUSION 
Originally conceived as an instrument of rehabilitation, the 
PSR has become anything but. Its sole purpose is to enhance an 
offender’s punishment wherever possible, embodying the worst 
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tendencies in the American criminal justice system. The document 
is created in secret and never exposed to the light until it is far too 
late. The defendant has no ability to meaningfully dispute the doc-
ument’s contents. His waiver of constitutional rights, which must 
be done knowingly and intelligently, is completely ineffective 
without this information. Elementary notions of fairness and due 
process command that the accused be able to see the PSR before he 
decides his own fate. 
The land of the free incarcerates more people than anywhere in 
the world, including authoritarian regimes such as Russia and Chi-
na.226 The trend will only continue without drastic institutional 
change, largely unattainable in the current climate of legislative 
gridlock. “The Guidelines are here to stay,” but the simple change 
argued in this Note would empower at least some defendants to 
exercise their trial right.227 This should be welcomed by defense 
attorneys, prosecutors, judges, and probation officers because it 
will only increase the fairness of the criminal justice system. The 
apparatus does not simply exist to dispense with guilty people. “An 
inscription on the walls of the Department of Justice states the 
proposition candidly for the federal domain: ‘The United States 
wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the 
courts.’”228 Anyone who supports more justice should favor pre-
plea disclosure of the PSR. 
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